Senate Special Committee to Protect All Texans – June 21, 2022

The Senate Special Committee to Protect All Texans met on June 21, 2022, to hear invited and public testimony on school safety, police training, and social media. A video archive of the hearing can be found here.

This report is intended to give you an overview of the discussions and highlight the various topics taken up. It is not a verbatim transcript of the discussions but is based upon what was audible or understandable to the observer and the desire to get details out as quickly as possible with few errors or omissions.

 

Opening Comments

• Committee rules adopted
• Chair Nichols – Similar to what we have during session & for Senate Transportation
• Chair Nichols – Have members present who are not members of the committee, open to any member
• Chair Nichols – Asking that committee members not presuppose policy solutions & listen to witnesses
• Chair Nichols – Justice and police systems failed Uvalde
• Chair Nichols – Will continue until midnight tonight
• Kolkhorst – Visited superintendents and personnel in over 70 ISDs within her Senate district; each superintendent mentioned mental and behavioral health as a driving issue, also mentioned need for SROs and were supportive of the Guardian program
• Kolkhorst – Continues to be challenges in hardening schools
• Creighton – Owe the people of Texas answers for the things that took place and harm done, can appropriate funds and set up programs, but have to be willing to follow the money and follow up
• Creighton – Need to be diligent in policy and mandates that 5m students are safe
• Zaffirini – Must take action, people want us to take decisive action
• West – Without discussing Second Amendment rights this will be an incomplete discussion; need to know we’ve done enough to keep children safe; should also invite teacher orgs as well
• Campbell – Many dynamics affecting mental wellbeing of society
• Perry – Hopefully will learn that we have a lot of data creators, plans, asks, etc. but don’t give guidelines or funding
• Perry – Next shooter is already out there, job is to thwart success of the shooter, believing that we can make a policy that stops this is naïve
• Perry – Often have programs that are still getting up to speed 4 years later
• Bettencourt – Appointments to committee is designed to get to the facts of the situation; haven’t seen facts changing 180 degrees like this before, hopefully we can get near to the bottom with the facts
• Hughes – Frustrating when the facts keep changing, more frustrating for those at home without access to witnesses; certainly there are things we can all agree on
• Gutierrez – Last period of days have been deeply personal, have been in Uvalde 20 out of last 28 days; shares experience being with and hearing from parents of victims
•  Gutierrez – Have 8k school campuses, need to do more than $100m in hardening, need to address mental health, need common sense gun solutions; 18 year old shouldn’t have easy access
• Hall – Need to be very wise in what we’re doing, next perpetrator is already out there & need to work to minimize; need to keep in mind what we can do via law
• Hall – Gun laws are widespread in Chicago and city has high gun deaths; misdemeanors or state jail felonies
• Hall – Increase in mental health issues among school age population, need to look at root cause
• Hall – Need to hold people accountable; doesn’t take a gun to cause harm

 

Steve McCraw, TX Department of Public Safety

• Has been 28 days since massacre at Robb Elementary, much has been done and much
• Compelling evidence that the law enforcement response was an abject failure and antithetical to everything learned since Columbine
• 3 minutes after start of shooting, there were sufficient armed officers; commander at scene placed lives of officers ahead of children
• Some things were done well, teachers quickly activated active shooter protocols
• Not done with investigation, won’t be done until DA is satisfied and have the facts
• Provides overview of perpetrator, 18 years old, active on social media and gaming platforms; communicated with individuals who seemed supportive of the shooting
• Suspect took on persona and dress of a school shooter, but wasn’t reported; could’ve intervened if we would’ve known, important for public to report issues for investigation
• Provides overview of events, at least 8 months prior was on a path to violence, asked family member to purchase him a weapon, began buying magazines, optics, slings, etc., told acquaintance in Germany what he was planning and what he did
• Drove to Robb Elementary and crashed close to the school, 11:29 AM teacher called 9-1-1, 11:31 suspect started shooting
• McCraw plots the movements of the shooter on a map and timeline on a chart
• Had 7 officers in the building by 11:36 AM, no SRO in the school, SRO misidentifies subject and passed him initially
• Active shooter goals are 1) stop the killing and 2) stop the dying, also isolate, distract, and neutralize
• Officers reported shooter was “contained,” but not appropriate action for the situation
• McCraw goes through conversations between dispatcher and UPD Chief Arredondo
• McCraw highlights several instances where UPD information was incorrect or misleading, suspect location misidentified several times
• Shooter was reported as barricaded and stationary, but was still active
• Team was reported ready at 12:27 AM, still discussing breach and going after shooter at 12:45 AM
• Chair Nichols – The outside door was unlocked? At one time there was a rock, a teacher removed the rock and door closed? Was it closed and lock didn’t work?
  • Can only lock doors from the outside, removing rock meant the door closed securely, but no way to tell if it was unlocked
• Chair Nichols – Did you check to see if lock was malfunctioning?
  • On exterior doors, locks were working fine; but glass near doors wasn’t fortified and shooter could’ve gotten access
• Chair Nichols – Lock was functioning correctly?
  • Was functioning correctly, was closed but was unlocked
• Chair Nichols – I thought if it closed it locked?
  • Different procedures to lock and unlock
• Chair Nichols – Classroom door, was it locked or unlocked?
  • Classroom door can’t be locked from the inside, only from the outside; no way for teacher or subject to lock door from the inside
• Chair Nichols – Heard reports that lock was malfunctioning?
  • Lock was functional, strikeplate was not
• Chair Nichols – Never a request to have that lock fixed?
  • There were requests, teacher thought the lock was broken
• Chair Nichols – Request made days before shooting, weeks, months?
  • Can get this to you
• Chair Nichols – On the officer’s radio, heard that he didn’t have the radio, or the radio wouldn’t work in the school?
  • Conducted tests on the site, only Border Patrols’ radios worked in that section of the building
• Chair Nichols – So we had a SRO whose radio wouldn’t work in that building?
  • Correct, nor would most other LEO radios, Border Patrol had a stronger boost on their radio tower
• Zaffirini – Highlights communication with shooter’s acquaintances, etc.; what is it that we must change going forward?
  • Asking for assessments and recommendations for things that could be done better, asked School Safety Center for similar; DPS conducted its own safety assessment
  • Provided some recommendations to Commissioner Morath
  • Recommendations & issues include: 1) reinforcing campus perimeter fence, 2) lack of controlled access points to the campus, 3) access points don’t funnel visitors to one location, 4) no strike plates on exterior doors to prevent prying, 5) easily breachable glass panes near doors, 6) classroom doors were easily accessible once in the building, 7) mobile classrooms were easily accessible, 8) adjoining classroom doors, 9) knock box with keys, 10) no duress or mass alert system, 11) incorrect interior diagrams, 12) emergency response comms enhancement system
• Zaffirini – What can we do to ensure effective communications in schools?
  • Cellphones worked, so cellular backbone was sufficient
  • Portable radios first responders had didn’t; only thing we can do is replace with a new system or use signal expanders within the school
• Zaffirini – Trying to see what we can learn from Uvalde and expand statewide
  • Every school should be evaluated for that
  • Can test radio systems in each school
• Zaffirini – Near the border, cell service from Mexico is more powerful, do we need to look at comms and make recommendations?
  • Yes
• Zaffirini – What responsibility do we have to monitor social media and intercede?
  • Messages that would’ve led to concerns were done through private messages that would’ve required subpoena
  • Requires public to report proactively
  • There is so much data to filter that the only solutions that can work are algorithms built to detect threats
• Zaffirini – Should we consider a mandatory reporting law? Similar to what we had with child abuse?
  • Can’t speak to policy, but certainly would help
• Zaffirini – Have heard so much conflicting information, what hope is there that families will get the truth?
  • Crushing demand for information, going by physical evidence that we’ve collected today
• Zaffirini – In 2019, passed bill to require active shooter plan & training, are these laws working or do we need to revisit?
  • Obviously not enough training was done in this situation, terrible decisions were made by the on-scene commander
  • Texas State has the foremost active shooter training program
  • Disappointed in social media industry for not being more proactive, they have resources that could identify potential threats
• Zaffirini – What rec should we adopt?
  • Need to train more, need to make sure responding LEO has equipment like shields and breaching tools
• Kolkhorst – Did the shooter commit animal cruelty?
  • Heard this in interviews, wasn’t brought to LEO attention, but reports not based on physical evidence
  • Believe that he did, part of pathway
• Kolkhorst – Do we have a toxicology report?
  • Medical examiner is still writing final report
• Kolkhorst – Classroom door that he entered, the lock was broken?
  • The strike plate was malfunctioning, only was it locks is from outside and get it to seat in the strike plate
• Kolkhorst – So with the LEO communications, there was never a need for a key because the door wasn’t locked?
  • I don’t believe the door was ever secured, shooter couldn’t have locked it from inside
  • Not sure anyone touched the door to check if it was locked
  • Shouldn’t need to wait for a key to breach, windows are access points
• Kolkhorst – Have heard many different reports about how long he was outside, how many shots did he fire before entering the school?
  • 3 rounds at the funeral home, another 24 rounds into different classrooms as he walked towards the door
• Kolkhorst – And did those bullets enter those classrooms?
  • Two others injured due to those shots
  • Only bullets from officers were in room 111
• Creighton – Within 3 minutes of shooter entering school, 9 officers were in the school with rifles, correct?
  • Yes, as many as 11, 2 with rifles
• Creighton – Chief Arredondo stated on comms that the LEOs only had pistols, what is the fact?
  • 2 had rifles, but there was never a need for rifles, number of rifles increased over time
• Creighton – What in LEO training would lead Chief Arredondo to say he needed more rifles?
  • Don’t need rifles, risky with pistols, but officers have body armor and less likely that children would be killed
• Creighton – So within 3 minutes of shooter entering had 9 officers with pistols and rifles, and at 5 minutes Chief Arredondo said the shooter was contained in an office
• Creighton – Is there an office on the floor plan?
  • Not that I’m aware of
• Creighton – Wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that kids were in the classroom?
  • More than reasonable to assume there were children in the classrooms
• Creighton – Was there any reason within LEO training either the door wouldn’t have been checked given the breaching equipment available? Why would the Chief wait?
  • Wanted outside inspector to assess these issues; doctrine is not to wait for SWAT, go in with 1 officer and immediately engage the shooter
• Creighton – Find it difficult to understand why the Chief referred to shooter being barricaded in an office given children in classrooms
  • Don’t know why, windows are an option, saw in Santa Fe how effective getting on the scene and moving quickly was
  • Windows are useful for officers outside, there are things you can do to protect children in the room; hitting windows in 111 and 112 would’ve distracted the shooter
• Creighton – DPS wasn’t involved in on-site decisions, has been very involved in investigating after the fact
  • DPS floods resources, but more isn’t often better
• Creighton – There was an established incident commander when you arrived?
  • Yes
  • Speaking from the perspective of LEOs in general, mistakes were made by the on-scene commander
• Creighton – At 19 minute mark, first ballistic shield was brought into the school, can you describe this, would the 1 shield with an unlocked door have been enough to advance
  • Never needed the shield, don’t have time for a shield with an active shooter
• Creighton – Difficult because Chief Arredondo is not here today, trying to understand thought process with the resources he had
  • There was always a reason to wait, every time resources arrived there was another reason to wait
• Creighton – When would an officer make the decision not to follow the incident response commander?
  • Dangerous to self-deploy, especially with conflicting reports
• Creighton – At what point is a subjective decision made to veer way from incident commander?
  • Great question for subject matter experts; always dangerous to act without full information
• Creighton – With the lack of interoperability of the radios, any conceivable scenario where the text messages from the children in the classroom would be communicated to those outside the building so different decisions could’ve been made? How is it possible this didn’t happen?
  • One officer did hear this, radio communication was chaotic
  • Not sure who this officer told this to or if it was communicated on on-scene commander
• Creighton – So in a chaotic situation like this, no way to channel dispatch?
  • Not in this case, but doesn’t mean it can’t be relayed, cell phones worked; always other options
• Creighton – Any option for breaching exterior classroom window? Any evidence that LEOs were outside?
  • Officers rescued hundreds using windows in other classrooms
• Creighton – Senate led effort to remove cap on school marshal program; do you have any objection to establishing programs like this on school campuses given eligibility, training, and collaboration between the marshal and local emergency response?
  • No reservation, not enough police officers in the state to be everywhere at once
• Creighton – Asks after response of officers in first minutes
  • Even when officers arrived, went in 3 minutes after
  • Suspect fired 100s of rounds in minutes, ideally he would’ve been confronted in the South-North hallway before he could’ve gotten to the classroom
• Creighton – Within 5 minutes on LEOs entering building, Chief Arredondo said he didn’t have necessary resources to advance; how many minutes from entering building did officers move?
  • 1 hour, 14 minutes, 8 seconds
• Chair Nichols called for a 5 minute break

• West – Asks for clarification on DPS’ role
  • DPS was not in control of the scene, involved in the investigation
• West – Asks after video
  • Yes, there is video from the funeral home, surveillance, etc., will be released when appropriate by the DA
  • DA has only wanted to keep misinformation form the public due to impact on victims
• West – Is there info the DA has that could be released to the public to assure them the process is transparent?
  • There is video, House Investigative Committee has access, DA has asked that DPS not talk to the media, not release info or videos to media
• West – Video released to media shows an officer with a rifle and a shield, correct?
  • Video will show there are as many as 11 officers and 2 rifles within minutes of officers arriving on the scene
• West – Saw 1 with a shield and with a rifle
  • Haven’t watched this bit, watched entire video so can’t comment
• West – Officer with shield could have advanced and tried to breach the door?
  • Didn’t need the shield to advance
• West – Could the officer have done that with that shield?
  • Yes, could have done so immediately
  • First shield arrived at 11:52, 2nd and 3rd shield arrived soon thereafter
• West – Shots fired after the first shield arrived?
  • Correct
• West – DPS has no role in school safety audits?
  • Correct
• West – Highlights another incident where multiple LEOs took out a shooter; any concern from you on areas where large numbers of children have gathered, e.g. summer camps
  • Absolutely, outdoor activities, camps, etc. are soft targets
• West – Any best practices for protecting those kids?
  • Duncanville is a good example, immediately isolated the suspect and acted
• West – As it relates to the weapon they used in Uvalde, 171 rounds fired, is a reasonable person 18-19 years old mature enough to get an assault weapon
  • Policy decision, can only say certain people shouldn’t have one
• West – Should the average 18 year old have one without training?
  • Was in the army at that age, certain people will never be mature enough, some will always be a threat
• West – You had training and screenings to use those weapons in the army; do you believe 18 year olds should have screenings and training?
  • Policy decision, certain people should not have them, if we have specific & credible info that an individual is a threat, then limited access is helpful
• West – If we increased age to 21 years, would most parents feel confident that children would be safety
  • Not in a position to interpret whether they would feel safer
• West – Would grandparents would feel safer?
  • Grandparents would feel safer with safe people with guns, rather than unsafe people with guns
  • Individuals with weapons, teachers with guns may be the only one in the way of a mass shooter
• West – Mass shooters are between 16 and 21, average age around 19; do you think we need to take a second look at whether these persons are mature enough to operate these weapons
  • Less to do with maturity, more with capacity
• West – Not saying we take weapons away, but should be an age certain to purchase a weapon of that magnitude
  • See why you would want to, already restricted handguns, goes back to policy decision
• Birdwell and McCraw discuss breach practices, many options, risk of striking bystanders
• Birdwell – Media reports Border Patrol made the breach, did Border Patrol or UPD make the breach?
  • Both
• Birdwell – With all the representation from various agencies, UPD is still the active commander of the scene?
  • Yes, could be argued that he turned it over at some point when Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) arrived
• Birdwell – At 11:54 AM when DPS special agent entered the building, what authority does a DPS special agent have from others
  • DPS special agents focus on gangs, criminal enterprise, sex trafficking, etc.
  • Troopers patrol, special agents focused on organized crime, Texas Rangers assist in major violent crime
• Birdwell – In the timeline its clear that the DPS special agent is very focused on breaching now with his arrival; understand desire not to coopt authority just because state officer arrived, given the situation here, would there be any change to this protocol to allow DPS to take command
  • Body camera from DPS officer shows he worked his way in, can see 15 officers stacked up
  • Hopeful with training can determine who shouldn’t be in leadership positions
  • DPS officers may not have the info, reluctant to say there should be a hierarchy of entities that take over; preference is to delegate as far down as possible
• Birdwell – Is there any evidence that cartels, border gangs, etc. provided support to shooter due to number of border agents with kids in the school?
  • None whatsoever, hasn’t been linked to other reports
  • Suspect acted alone
• Birdwell – Did any state agency play a part in placing shooter with his grandmother, or solely a family decision?
  • Family decision, estranged from father and mother
• Campbell – Did the grandmother call the police?
  • Someone did, she ran across the street and neighbor contacted police
• Campbell – No one checked the door knob, why did the shooter choose 111 and 112?
  • Shooter chose the west door, not sure of reasoning
• Campbell and McCraw discuss layout of the classroom, connecting door between 111 and 112, easy for shooter to access both
• Campbell – Are classrooms fitted with an alarm?
  • No, no panic button that would’ve alerted the entire campus at this school
• Campbell – Is there a central place that could’ve alarmed campus
  • They have the Raptor system
  • Careful with this, in Santa Fe the fire alarm drew children out of the classroom
• Campbell – Is there a code system to identify the situation?
  • No
  • They had an address system, teachers and administrators exercised their protocols
• Campbell – Why did the chief say we’d lost 2 kids?
  • Not sure, have been unable to reinterview him
• Campbell – Chief said that they would lose more kids if they didn’t act, but they needed to put that to the side
  • One of the reasons we wanted to reinterview was to have him put this in context
• Campbell – Important to get victims to medical care quickly, delaying missed the opportunity to save children; was always an active shooter situation, but wasn’t treated as one
  • Well said, was always an active shooter situation, timeline was always dire
• Perry – Looking at the bar lock, same type that was in my high school 43 years ago; has an ability to set whether it will lock or not lock on closure, someone had to decide that it wouldn’t lock, do we know who that person was?
  • No
• Perry – Do we know if this is standard procedure at the ISD?
  • Not sure about this ISD, but have reports that those doors were often left open at this campus
• Perry – There was a conscious decision to leave this door open
• Perry – Have left a lot of discretion to the districts, maybe not the best choice; grandmother was shot shortly beforehand and in the area, in my ISDs 9-1-1 call would’ve locked down the campuses; was there a safety plan in place that would’ve locked down campuses with this event?
  • Not aware of one, familiar with this practice
  • Some of the gaps at Robb Elementary don’t exist in other campuses
• Perry – Should schools have immediate lockdown in these situations?
  • Yes
• Perry – Shooter crashed into a ditch close to the school, was there any indication of a lockdown at that point? Had a teacher call
  • Not sure, teacher’s call resulted in campus lockdown
• Perry – But really not because the door was left open; but someone took initiative at the crash, lockdown just didn’t get done; was there protocol to lockdown the campus?
  • There was protocol, saw it in the Raptor system, they did go into lockdown
  • DPS recommended some efficiencies and mass alerts system
• Perry – Do you know if Uvalde had a safety plan?
  • Not aware, asked School Safety Center to look at this
• Perry – Why would you have a door that doesn’t secure from the inside, why would this be universal in school building?
  • Can’t say, there are things we can use instead of locking systems
• Perry – No reason you can think of that this is standard practice?
  • No, no way for teacher to tell if the door is locked
• Perry – Many options, incl. $5 doorstops, individual is looking for the easiest access
• Perry – From a first responders perspective, with multiple campuses on site, would it not be beneficial to have campus A, B, etc.?
  • Certainly standardization would be helpful & familiarity with the campus
• Perry – If you’re limited on resources, most ISDs will say they are which is debatable, in looking at hardening the campus, if you had to pick between hardening and a SRO, which would you pick?
  • Highlights benefit of SRO with familiarity of the campuses, helps LEOs isolate and neutralize the threat
• Perry – That’s reactive, big difference in reaction and keeping individuals out of the classroom; could spend funds on taking human element out of it
  • Would try for both, don’t disagree with proper perimeter, locking doors, etc.
• Perry – Most of the ISDs need to do a rethink, if classroom could’ve locked from the inside then it would’ve made a difference
  • 3 minutes would’ve made a difference, officers could’ve responded
• Perry – There was a decision to leave that door open

• Perry – Even if it is a juvenile record, the information goes to DPS which goes to FBI who decides if that information is inclusive in a background check?
  • True; could go into the NICS system and require that information
• Perry – Midland and Southerland shooters were not provided a federal background check
• Perry – Failed to lock a district down, response was horrendous, but have laws in place today that people are not following
• Perry and McCraw discuss the social media aspect of the case
• Perry – What is the recourse for officers who were neglectful in their response?
  • Not aware of anything currently
• Perry – Is nothing in statute that would not prohibit those who have been neglectful from going to another ISD?
  • No; but discharge notes could affect future employment
• Perry and McCraw discuss how notoriety could be a part of motivation to commit such crimes
• Bettencourt asks McCraw to demonstrate the lock system of the school doors; cannot be locked from the inside
  • System is ridiculous from a security standpoint; classroom doors were unsecured
• Bettencourt – News stations said last active shooter training was in March?
  • They completed training, not sure if in March
• Bettencourt – Were no external barriers and external and internal doors were not secured
• Bettencourt – How many interviews have you conducted?
  • Over 700
• Bettencourt – Shooter was a truant student previously employed in the fast food industry
• Bettencourt and McCraw discuss the shooter was never previously reported to law enforcement
• Bettencourt – Response timeline of the incident is unacceptable, breakdown in control and response by the police; any way to rectify this?
  • Response is contrary to what we practice
• Bettencourt – The incident commander needs to come be accountable to the Senate
• Hughes asks McCraw about the 911 call made after the shooter’s grandmother was shot
• Hughes – Have a system when officers arrive are given a blueprint? Should have that in place
  • Depends on the agency; since Santa Fe troopers have to be familiar with school campuses
  • Have started to get blueprints of campuses, but not sure what was in place at Uvalde ISD
• Hughes – Officers who were shot at/shot, came through the door or drywall?
  • Currently doing analysis on that, seems like both
• Hughes – Know Uvalde ISD had alert training or what other training they got?
  • TCOLE would have more information on that
• Hughes and McCraw discuss parental notification by the school; some parents were restrained
  • McCraw – Is understandable why parents were kept out; did not arrest any parents
• Hughes – Default position for these doors is locked?
  • Yes
• Hughes asks McCraw to explain the strike plate on the doors were not latching
• Hughes – Teacher had already reported their door was not securing properly?
  • At least on one occasion
• Hughes – Do not wait for shields or anything during training?
  • Correct, we go in
• Hughes – Should be equipping every officer and vehicle to have those tools like breaching tools and ballistic shields?
  • Yes; will provide the these resources if the legislature appropriates it
• Hughes – Any way to determine how different the outcome would be if response had been sooner?
  • District Criminal Attorney has enlisted someone to do that analysis
• Kolkhorst asks McCraw about the timeline; what time was the 911 call?
  • Can get that to you
• Hinojosa – Response was a complete failure, why didn’t DPS take control of the situation?
  • Local agency has jurisdiction; is not practice to take over jurisdiction in the middle of an incident
• Hinojosa – Understand protocol, but lives were at stake; do not understand why DPS did not and cannot take control in these instances
  • DPS does not have authority by law to take over; was a lack of information and misinformation
• Campbell – Could have a volunteer program for veterans who could carry and protect the perimeter of schools?
  • Would be the first in line for that
• West – Timeline shows confusion in who was in control? Notes the timeline shows a back and forth between officers discussing who was not/was the supervisor who needed to approve certain actions
  • Yes does indicate a breakdown in structure
• West – Who led the breach? Who made the call?
  • BORTAC did and someone finally made the decision; did not occur until they found a key that worked
• West and McCraw discuss the grandmother’s medical status
• Perry – Texas interoperability channel plan, was an option to have direct channel? Would have helped?
  • Do not know
• Perry – Miscommunication was a technology problem or commander problem?
  • Chief did not have radio with him and portable radios did not work inside the building
• Perry – Do we have a system across the board that works together?
  • Yes, did not work inside that building; not enough signal
• Perry – If DPS were in charge in the initial confrontation with the shooter would have not fallen back?
  • Would expect it to be the case; doctrine says do not retreat
• Perry and McCraw discussed those officers had bullet proof vests on
• Perry – And they chose to retreat, they could’ve engaged 3 on 1

• Zaffirini – A few months before May 24th, ISD had adopted silent alarm system, but they weren’t drilled, had no backup warnings
  • Recommend using silent alarms around the campus
• Hinojosa – Reports of social media communication, would a fusion center have been able to pick up that communication
  • Those were private messages, wouldn’t have been able to pick it up without a warrant
• Kolkhorst – In discussing rounds fired, ARs are not always easy to handle; do you know if he had been practicing his shooting
  • Shooter didn’t drive, needed someone to drive him to a range; he had not trained and had not had practice
• Chair Nichols – Does 9-1-1 in Uvalde go to Sheriff’s Office?
  • Goes to UPD
• Chair Nichols – Had heard it was to the Sheriff’s Department, so you’re saying it was the UPD but they could not convey that info to officers and SRO?
  • We could only find one officer that heard the reports on dispatch
• Chair Nichols – When the police get that info on 9-1-1 I would assume that gets conveyed to the school police
  • Yes, comms are interoperable in the sense that we can listen to each other’s conversations
• Chair Nichols – Where did he get the money to purchase?
  • From reports, saved money from working fast food restaurants, did not have major expenses
• Chair Nichols – You had a photo of a magnetic plate you can put on a strike plate to keep the door from locking, you found that in the school?
  • Multiple in the school, convenience feature to allow students to go to the restroom, etc.
• Gutierrez – When was the timeline completed?
  • Have had a timeline since the beginning, have updated
• Gutierrez – When was it last updated?
  • Yesterday, when interview material was taken out in favor of video material
• Gutierrez – There have been concerns of transparency, you were ordered by DA to stop communication because she was starting an investigation; last Friday she said she was not investigating anything
• Gutierrez – One fix is having timelines in a faster way
• Gutierrez – CSEC suggested to me that the 9-1-1 calls were going to the UPD and they can communicate with up to 17 first responders
• Gutierrez – Chief Arredondo has recently said he was not the incident response commander, info today was constructed from bodycam and surveillance footage
• Gutierrez – Did Chief Arredondo say he was incident commander?
  • Not that I’m aware of
• Gutierrez – And he was not capable of communicating this inside due to radio comms issues
  • Yes
• Gutierrez – Anywhere from 3 to 13 DPS troopers in the building? Fluid situation
  • Yes, provides overview of DPS troopers in and out of the building
• Gutierrez – Who told Ranger #1 to leave the hallway?
  • Don’t know
• Gutierrez – Who told Ranger #2 to leave?
  • Same one
• Gutierrez – What about the trooper who left at 6 minutes
  • Left to rescue students and clear other rooms
• Gutierrez – After 12:16, how long was the Ranger there?
  • For the duration
• Gutierrez – Was he directed by anyone at that point?
  • UPD lieutenant directed he assist in finding keys
• Gutierrez – Highest ranking member from DPS at that time
  • No, a Sergeant was present
• Gutierrez – Staff officers usually volunteer?
  • Usually officers want to be part of the stack
• Gutierrez – BORTAC just went in, didn’t take orders from anyone?
  • BORTAC arrived after 12:16 PM and then discussed with the Chief
• Gutierrez – When do you expect to release the body cam data
  • Will release this when the DA approves it
• Gutierrez – When she approves it; is this an investigation or not, she says its in your authority
  • She gets the opportunity to review the information; part of this is also an officer involved shooting, always presented to the grand jury
• Gutierrez – This isn’t the final report is it?
  • No
• Gutierrez – Active shooter or incident commander protocol, which takes precedent?
  • Active shooter protocol
• Gutierrez – Not trying to blame anyone
  • Chief Arredondo may not have wanted to be4 incident commander, but he was as ranking officer
• Gutierrez – But couldn’t communicate given the radio comms issues
  • Good point, but can communicate with the officers in the hall, had personnel enough to pursue the shooter
• Gutierrez – Active shooter protocols take precedent over incident commander, so every officer should have gone in
  • A little disingenuous
• Gutierrez – Why
  • Because someone always takes the lead
• Gutierrez – Not disingenuous when active shooter protocols takes precedence
• Chair Nichols – Given you a lot of leeway, sounding more like a deposition, would suggest you ask your question or make your point
• Gutierrez – Do we need to fix our radio problems in rural Texas
  • Absolutely, system needs to be replaced
• Gutierrez – Have you had communication from the RGV COG about replacing that
  • Not to my knowledge
• Gutierrez – When will we have numbers of Sheriff’s Office, ISD PD, etc. others
  • Have those numbers, can share with permission of DA
  • At any time, 361 officers were either on the perimeter or in the school, majority were federal officers
  • DPS had as many as 91 officers in the area, 2 game wardens
• Gutierrez – How many DPS troopers?
  • 91 DPS officers overall, majority in secure perimeter activities
• Gutierrez – Was there any joint training between LEOs in this area?
  • Not aware that there has been
• Gutierrez – Fair to say that many of the officers were for the Operation Lone Star task force?
  • Yes, many came up from Eagle Pass
• Gutierrez – When we spoke earlier, you said DPS would never stand down to another agency?
  • Not sure what I said when, wouldn’t be surprised
  • In most cases taking over would be a mistake
• Gutierrez – Shooter purchased the gun from the same clerk?
  • One had to be ordered, picked both of them up
  • Hundreds of rounds purchased at the store, other rounds purchased online
• Gutierrez – No red flag laws in Texas, in this region if a kid buys 2 ARs and ammo it is usually for sale or that something bad is going to happen
  • Certainly suspicious
• Gutierrez – Can you let me know how many 18–21-year-olds have AR-15s in TX?
  • Not sure ATF has this info
• Hall – Have heard of many things that weren’t done right, TX legislature made the gun free zones, overwhelming number of schools have a sign out front
• Hall – Gun free zone signs are a message to bad actors that no one in the facility will be armed, reasonable assumption?
  • Don’t know that, marshals and others are armed
• Hall – Others have put up signs that staff is armed, this is a different message
• Hall – Amazing that we have doors that can’t be locked from inside, can’t fix some things with legislation
• Hall – Need to put more emphasis hardening schools, implementing these initiatives
• Menendez – Reviews early timeline with McCraw, had a quick response from officers on the seen, then more than 100 rounds were fired
  • Yes, based on counting from audio
• Menendez – Shooter purchased high capacity magazines before he was 18
  • Yes, 30 round magazines
• Menendez – He can shoot 30 rounds as fast as he can pull the trigger, as many as 40 or 60 per minute
• Menendez – Chief Arredondo said that the shooter had an AR-15, had shot a lot, needed more firepower
• Menendez – Could he have done as much damage with a bat, knife, or revolver?
  • No

 

Cullen Grissom, Texas Commission on Law Enforcement

• Provides overview of TCOLE, TCOLE oversees minimum standards for licensure
• Starting fielding questions on whether current active shooter training is sufficient, investigation is ongoing; not sure if failures were in training or in application of the training
• Prepared to speak on what the training requirements currently are, happy to work with legislature on any changes moving into session
• Provides overview of school marshal program, limited peace officer authority, must complete 80 hour training, 16 hour renewal course req’d and psychological exam
• For school LEOs, can have those employed by ISD PD or SROs, SROs are detailed to schools
• 311 ISD police departments currently, 3,400 peace officers in those PDs
• School LEOs have a separate and distinct training req, must complete 2 different types of training within 180 days, 20 hours of child & adolescent psych, conflict resolution, de-escalation techniques, etc., and active shooter response
• Highlights Guardian program, allows schools to allow licensed firearm holders to carry on campus, no oversight from TCOLE
• Perry – Can you speak to employment history of Chief Arredondo?
  • Not sure
• Perry – Would you have that info? Don’t think its protected; ISD officers will go through 20 hour course and active shooter training, any other LEO background?
  • ISD police officers go through the same program as any other peace officer, ISD reqs are in addition
• Perry – How involved is TCOLE in ISD officer hiring?
  • TCOLE is not involved in the background check, locally done
  • TCOLE looks at capacity for appointment
• Perry – Something derogatory about the officer in prior employment, TCOLE wouldn’t have access or couldn’t remove someone who hadn’t done their duty?
• Perry – If the chief is ultimately removed from Uvalde, the chief could go work elsewhere 3 months later with TCOLE’s blessing?
  • Very narrow window to take license action, can take action when convicted of certain crimes
• Perry – If Chief Arredondo is removed, he can be a chief tomorrow?
  • Without license action
• Perry – Are you going to review some of this?
  • We can review performance
• West – Would hope we would refrain from saying he should lose his job without full facts
• Perry – Not saying he shouldn’t, but he would be able to be rehired if dismissed
• West – If police officers resign before they are terminated, are they able to go elsewhere
  • In most circumstances, yes
• West – Need systematic change, if we need reform, look forward to working with you
• West – 62 school marshal districts, urban or rural?
  • Pretty big mix, most are suburban to rural
• West – Are they effective in deterrence? Would guess so as there haven’t been any incidents
  • In terms of deterrence you have two schools of thought, some schools don’t tell anyone they have marshals
  • Don’t have any data to respond to the deterrent effect of either
• West – Do we know if Uvalde had a marshal program?
  • Confidential in open forum
• West – What about a Guardian program?
  • TCOLE has no visibility on Guardians
• West – Would like to visit privately on the marshal program
• Chair Nichols – Would think that psychologically that signs saying armed individuals are present are a bigger deterrent
• Kolkhorst – Was recently at Iola ISD, they have a sign outside
• Kolkhorst – Many ISDs have Guardian programs, but no duty to report
  • Completely locally controlled
• Kolkhorst – Is TCOLE training different from ALERRT?
  • Fundamentally no, all working from the isolate, district, neutralize doctrine
  • Had graduate of ALERRT developing the TCOLE training course
• Kolkhorst – Should all officers have active shooter training?
  • All officers going through basic peace officer course within last 10 years, have active shooter training, there is no recurring requirement
  • Many train through ALERRT
• Kolkhorst – But they don’t have to train through ALERRT
  • Not obligated to go through ALERRT
• Hinojosa and Grissom discuss goals of TCOLE, primarily licensure, also provide training standards, does not train officers directly
  • TCOLE contracts with 113 police academies
• Hinojosa – Training uniform around the state?
  • Depends on the course you’re talking about, active shooter training curriculum is written by TCOLE and handed off to local partners
• Hinojosa – Probably differs in quality and training of officers
  • Can be different levels of quality
• Hinojosa – Not involved in licensing, following up if training academies are rigid?
  • Audit training academies for compliance, have 2 evaluators that sit in on training, but not pervasive
  • Will be fluctuations based on local resources, new training, etc.
• Hinojosa – In boot camp, everyone goes through the same program and there are controls
• Birdwell discusses levels of defense on campus, Guardians, SROs, ISD PD, other LEOs
• Birdwell – Is there a disincentive of liability, e.g. Guardians have least amount of training, but carry greatest liability, different from ISD PD
  • In new peace officer start ups at districts, liability was not often a factor
• Perry – In the curriculum, every academy member has certain amount of mental health instruction, and there is an additional 20 or 40 hours training officers can pay for
  • Yes, you have crisis and de-escalation in basic course, optional mental health officer certificate afterwards; crisis training recurs
• Perry – Have heard there is a lot of duplication between the programs; why aren’t 100% of officers required to go after the additional certificate?
  • Recently updated programs, crisis intervention and mental health officer courses were similar up until recently
• Perry – Who gets paid to teach the additional course?
  • Regional academies, community colleges, etc.
• Perry – Would suggest this should be part of everyone’s training
• Perry – Do you hear concern from ISD police officers that we’ve lost ability to remove or refer students for help
  • Haven’t heard these conversations
• Perry – Needs to be a broader conversation
• Chair Nichols – Problem is what do you do with them
• Perry – When TEA comes up I’ll tell you what we tell people we do with them and how effective it is
• Chair Nichols – Issue in Uvalde was either lack of or poor training?
  • Haven’t arrived at that yet
• Chair Nichols – Where should we go? What should we do better?
  • Problem is we keep needing responses because we haven’t come up with a prevention method
• Kolkhorst – Everyone receives active shooter training?
  • Has been part of the course for 10 years

 

John Curnutt, Advance Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center, Texas State University

• Provides overview of ALERRT Center, have provided training to large numbers of officers, conduct research on after action reports and partner with agencies; work with agencies to help build their own training
• Chair Nichols – Your program is a gold standard for these situations, officers still need to be licensed through TCOLE?
  • Vast majority of program is training responders to better respond, will have to have gone through basic peace officer training
• Chair Nichols – Does ALERRT training satisfy active shooter training at TCOLE?
  • We exceed them
• Zaffirini – How do you simulate real life situations?
  • Difficult, use load blanks, injury simulations, marking cartridges, etc.; trying to rewire past self-preservation instinct, realism helps with this
• Zaffirini – Does it include types of weapons and magazines used in shootings?
  • Yes
• Zaffirini – Any data on effectiveness versus real life situations?
  • Have received awards and accolades from many sources
• Zaffirini – What obligation do we have to offer protection to those we expect to respond?
  • Have talked about shields, body armor, etc.
  • Minimum training requirements need to be increased
• Zaffirini – Who can take your training?
  • Any state, local, tribal, county, etc. peace officer in TX
  • Funding is provided through line item, free to the LEOs, not entirely “free” as active personnel will need to be pulled off duty; ALERRT travels to the LEO
• Zaffirini – Do you train students to deal with radio and comms problems?
  • Yes, sometimes they ask we add more tech
  • Train to have officers communicate without jargon, straightforward
• Birdwell – Are you going to do your own AAR?
  • Called in at the request of DPS to be independent monitor, looking through their data and putting it into a report and noting inconsistencies with training
• Birdwell – How long does this take you?
  • Not very long, anticipating info as it comes in, analyzing soon
• Perry – Two active shooter trainings; does academy have hands on training?
  • Depends on the academy
• Perry – Your program is more demanding physically
  • Have a consistent approach, experiential learning is crucial
• Perry – Can you tell me how many ISD officers have gone through your training?
  • A few thousand out
• Perry – How many in a year?
  • In the state, thousands; able to scale way up
• Perry – Fair to say small percentage of ISD officers go through your course
  • Yes
• Perry – Active shooters in ISD setting is different from other settings?
  • Try and keep things as consistent as possible, some broad things are similar
• Perry – Was your training protocol followed in the response in Uvalde
  • Saw a couple things they did okay and a couple things were not as prescribed
• Perry – Things that didn’t work were catastrophic failure, cost lives
• West – Have you provided instructions for other settings like camps or recreation centers?
  • Embedded in our material, ALERRT is for responding to active attack on high occupancy buildings
• West and Curnutt discuss location of training, majority is mobile training state and US
• Chair Nichols – Suggestion for the committee?
  • Increase standards, mandatory 16 hour class, recurring training for every peace officer, incl. executive leadership

 

Commissioner Mike Morath, Texas Education Agency

• Highlights document outlining players in school safety in Texas, TEA and Texas School Safety Center are anchors in this setting
• Provides overview of 86th session omnibus school safety bill, SB 11: set up req that every school system have a plan, TxSSC audits and oversees, independent security audit every 3 years, TxSSC also controls list of service providers
• TEA can adopt facility standards for every building in the state, schools are also required to go through Safe & Supportive Schools Process were teams review everything happening; Threat Assessment Teams can escalate concerns
• TEA has conducted regional mapping and published statewide list of mental health resources; TCHATT comes from this process
• SB 11 required trauma-informed practices & curriculum changes for health on mental health & suicide prevention
• SB  11 established the school safety allotment, set by appropriations & can be spent on a variety of things
• SB 11 was also the original funding vehicle for the Texas Child Mental Health Care Consortium and the one-time hardening grants, $14m remains unallocated and LBB has sent guidance to extend that by 12 months
• Highlights TEA actions, incl. Safe & Supportive Schools Program, stood up a team of 6, new position that SSSP reports to
• TEA distributes funds as directed; federal Title IV funds go to school districts directly
• TEA has broad oversight to ensure education laws are followed around the state, haven’t yet deployed for school safety related noncompliance findings
• Most of what TEA does is in behavior management and mental health, not necessarily school safety
• TEA monitors Behavior Intervention Plans in special education as well
• Incident Response: preparedness exercises are crucial, staffing postures are important, TEA planning to expand technical assistance related to preparedness exercises, can do more than self-audits every 3 years
• TEA is drafting new minimum facility standard that will apply to all facilities, previously only applied to new facilities; will be based on what is necessary to control access
• Will be collecting data on how much assistance is needed for schools to comply
• Also looking at best practices and minimum facility posture rules for personnel
• On threat assessment teams, group reflects on what actions are needed to address student behavior, can range from school support to more extreme measures
• Expansion of technical assistance is needed to implement all of these
• Kolkhorst – How long had it been since the shooter had been in school?
  • No answer today, review process likely to take a couple more weeks, began being chronically absent in 6th grade
• Kolkhorst – Where are we with truancy laws?
  • Reports from superintendents is that there is difficulty in enforcing truancy actions, particularly since COVID
• Kolkhorst – Some are being homeschooled; asks after
  • Getting a slightly more normal picture of attendance, enrollment is down
• Zaffirini – Are you concerned if preparedness training is traumatic for students?
  • Needs to be very thoughtfully done, perhaps the only drills you should do with students present are lockdown drills, but can be done with staff
  • Stick to fire and tornado drills with students
  • Will attempt to increase clarity on nature and level of drills necessary at schools
• Zaffirini – What does a model safe school look like in a culture of safety?
  • Talking about keeping doors closed, access control
• Zaffirini – How can we ensure intended safety measures don’t have unintended consequences like fire hazards
  • Might have a number of features that are inoperable from outside, but can be operated from inside
• Zaffirini – Discussed $100m on school safety, but spent $3b on border security, do you have a cost estimate?
  • Can report cost estimate to be in compliance with TEA rule, roughly by August
• Zaffirini – Do you have an opinion on whether teachers should be armed?
  • Have encountered many who are former LEO or military who can serve in this capacity
• Zaffirini – Asks after interoperability
  • Degree of interoperability and interjurisdictional communication is largely a function of interjurisdictional exercise; part of preparedness exercises
• Zaffirini – Recommendations on school safety?
  • Incident response improvements, facilities access & control, and behavioral and threat assessment
  • Likely to be more lessons learned that will highlight additional legislative policy
  • Will share findings after review
• Hinojosa – Do we know how many schools are in compliance under SB 11
  • Under the multi-hazard operation plan, TxSSC might have more info
  • For facilities, its new construction and all should be in compliance
• Hinojosa – Who checks compliance? You don’t have that info?
  • TEA; couldn’t tell you specifically that all facilities comply with SB 11 rules
• Hinojosa – Responsibility needs to be with 1 agency, don’t know how many are not in compliance
  • Speaking to unified command & control, would generally agree
• Hinojosa – Highlights need of checking compliance and info on shortcomings
  • TxSSC probably does have insight on compliance
• West – Asks for recommendations to take back to constituents
  • Have taken steps to ensure safety in the fall, incl. review of access points, evaluation of needed repairs, door closure procedures, comprehensive review of safety procedures
  • There is a date certain, but don’t have it today
• West – Will be before this fall?
  • Yes
• West – You noted there is no review of facilities standards by the agency, more a resource issue than anything?
  • Combo statutory authority than resources
• West – Should consider that someone should be conducting these audits, could it be the TxSSC?
  • TxSSC is beginning to conduct intrusion tests, will largely be using labor through the service center ecosystem
• West – Testing all doors in the state would make parents more confident of student safety, should be done before school starts in August
  • Agrees
• West – Have you given any thoughts to the ongoing costs for school safety in Texas?
  • Yes, will hear TEA’s recommendations when developed
• Perry – Concerned we’re paralyzing the process by introducing so many into the process, much of what we’re talking about is common sense; is this too complicated to protect schools from bad actors
  • There are alternatives, it might be
• Perry – Are lockdowns with incidents in the area required or up to the district?
  • ISD would have this in the multi-hazard operational plan
• Perry – All new construction meets standards?
  • Set of rules took effect as of 2021, all new construction will comply
• Perry – Will I find locks in new construction that lock from the outside?
  • Will need to look into this
• Perry – Outside labeling associated to the building and campus layout, is this required? Might be a question for TxSSC
• Perry – Data shows that very few districts had a viable Emergency Operations Plan, many districts don’t have a dedicated person to coordinate response; TEA is somewhat responsible for this, shows lack of seriousness on the district level
• Perry – Don’t disagree on approach of loving children in crisis, but not all kids belong in the classroom anymore
  • TEA has disciplinary removal processes that allow children to be educated elsewhere
• Perry – Concerned this isn’t used as it should be and isn’t effective, not keeping track of these students after 4pm; when some students issue threats, get referred to JJAEP, but not held always because it doesn’t meet statute
  • Not convinced statute works as well as it could
• Perry – Truancy situation means we don’t do the broken windows approach anymore
  • Not that we don’t do this, but some of the tools aren’t available
• Perry – May need to look at those tools again; we do not have a solution for nonresponsive kids who don’t want to be fixed?
  • Do not have adequate referral space around the state
• Perry – So we don’t deal with kids who threaten bodily harm
  • Don’t say we don’t deal with them, we can improve
• Perry – What’s your idea with a student that goes to JJAEP and can leave at 4pom, should we be concerned they can show up at 8am to hurt people?
  • Yes you should
• Perry – What do we do with that? Ankle bracelet?
  • Schools have a lot of informal authority to remediate behavior, but difficult if a student has checked out
• Perry – Is there proper surveillance of these students?
  • Law enforcement question, process under law is the threat assessment process in the SSSP
• Perry – All kids are redeemable from a public education standpoint?
  • Need to have the posture that we have to do everything we can because they will continue to be with us
• Perry – When do you make the decision that they are a danger to students and the school, is there a process to move them for their own safety and safety of others?
  • DAEP and JJAEP are the processes, also capacity support
• Perry – And they need reform
• Campbell – TxSSC collects ISD self-reporting audits? They don’t have enforcement power
  • Correct, they have connections to enforcement and TEA
• Campbell – Dollars?
  • $9.72/kid is part of the FSP
• Campbell – If facilities are deficient, can you claw back some of that $9.72?
  • Don’t think we have authority to do this, but can appoint a conservator
• Campbell – Is it any wonder that kids are offtrack when we took prayer out of schools, pledges, porn, electronic devices, etc.; any opinion on that?
  • We are a fallen species with many weaknesses
• Bettencourt – Shooter had many indications of concerning behavior; what should a threat assessment have done?
  • Absenteeism should be noticed, schools have processes
• Bettencourt – Some number of people locally knew we had a problem, but it wasn’t acted on, do we know when it started; have a situation where the shooter was promoted year after year even with absenteeism
  • About .5% of students are held back statewide; students can’t obtain credit if they attend less than 75% of school
• Bettencourt – Was he under those thresholds?
  • No, 25% of 180 days is a lot of days
• Bettencourt – Was recently as an event where teachers said they tried to get help for kids, very common frustration
  • Wide array of capacity in how schools operate, some schools will be very strong, many in the middle, some will be almost nonfunctioning in ability to intervene
• Bettencourt – How do we legislate leadership?
  • Never figured it out, capacity supports, coaching supports, can help
• Bettencourt – Should we look at it as TxSSC is a center of excellence and then TEA is the enforcement branch?
  • Model could be looked at
• Bettencourt – Asks after SROs and funding
  • Anything we could do to help school strengthen their force posture would be helpful
• Bettencourt – Could look at this, fastest way to get trained professionals in the school
• Bettencourt – 340k doors around the state
  • These are outside doors, equipment is there to secure doors, but windows are also often positioned close by
  • Secure vestibules could help, about $1.2m per; investment to get the upgrades we want is significant
• Bettencourt – I think we could have the money available, but would require time to implement
  • Have to assume, if you don’t will create massive supply chain cost and inflation
• West – In the past few years a handful of districts have put school security packages in bonds
  • Many districts have school safety initiatives outside of the bond programs
• West – Didn’t we put something in SB 1 that requires DPS to do 30k school safety checks?
  • Don’t know the answer to that question
• West – Wondering about status of that as well
• Bettencourt – Was a rider in the bill
• West – Statistically, have kids in DAEP been involved in mass shootings?
  • Haven’t looked in the Ramos situation and not sure about Santa Fe
  • A lot of work on profiling that the Secret Service, but essentially the profile is there is no profile
• West – Need to tread cautiously on hardening DAEP programs
• Perry – What I’m told from teachers is that they leave from lack of respect, vulgarity, etc., DAEP doesn’t enter into it; overall culture we’ve created that leads to these situations, used to deal with this at the moment
• Perry – Respect for authority has been lost, DAEP has been watered down; may not be next shooter, but influences world we’re in today
• West – Agrees, look forward to working across party lines with the Commissioner to put in place specific programs recommended by educators; there is a disrespect that we’ve never seen before
• Zaffirini – Can you give an update on SB 168 by Blanco on best practices for active shooter drills
  • Will need to get back to you
• Zaffirini – Rules for SB 168 were adopted two weeks ago after the Uvalde shooting, is there anything that may need to be added to SB 168 training?
  • Likely yes, gets back to ways to do drills that don’t have negative effect on students
• Chair Nichols – Do we have best practices and protocols for building schools or are you still working on that?
  • There is a rule in effect that applies to all new construction
  • Working on now applying minimum standards to every school building in Texas
• Chair Nichols – Do schools get docked on accountability for reporting increases in disciplinary actions?
  • No accountability impact for state law
  • For special education, part of a broad performance review under federal law
• Chair Nichols – So the more they report the more they get dinged?
  • Reality under federal law, dumb that this is the way it works
  • Two ways to improve what is measured about campus discipline, can improve referrals or not let referrals occur
• Perry – Not speaking to 504 kids, I think we handle them well, most have life skill classes; need to deal with others regardless of demographics
• West – Funding was cut on JJAEP programs last time around
• Perry – Only have JJAEP in counties of 125k or more, majority don’t have anywhere to send kids
• West – Disproportionality has always been an issue, state can’t do everything, but do know we’re not doing enough
• Chair Nichols – Regarding the lock, latch mechanism didn’t align with the strike plate; can come up with standards, but unless someone checks it doesn’t matter
  • Right
• Chair Nichols – Leaving a lot to each school to check itself and it isn’t in its benefit to turn itself in; not suggesting what Gov. Abbot was suggesting, showing up unannounced could be dangerous
• Chair Nichols – If you had a team from the TxSSC call the superintendent the night before that a team would show up the next day, could get a manageable number of people that could conduct these checks, maybe twice a year
  • Intrusion test is exactly what TxSSC is planning to deploy, different fr5om a comprehensive maintenance test
• Chair Nichols – Have seen a number of members that might be willing to work towards something like that
• Bettencourt – Sen. Taylor’s staff checked, there were 25 employees checking plans from SB 11, but there wasn’t physical inspection of schools in the bill
• Hall – Recent conversation is the best so far, hope everyone was listening to Sen. Perry and Sen. West; protection and prevention are the problem
• Hall – Need to come away with meaningful actions on the prevention aspect; need to answer why we’ve had an explosive growth with mental issues in children
• Hall – Is there any latitude in SB 11 to look at the root cause?
  • That is the question that I wrestle with, how to improve the level of love & resilience and also increasing literacy and numeracy
• Hall – Can you use SB 11?
  • SB 11 provided funds to the coordinating board, schools have access to the $9.72 per student
• Chair Nichols – I think you’ll find it’s a breakup of the family unit, drugs, internet is in there somewhere
• Chair Nichols – Most superintendents point to parents if you want to know what’s wrong with the student
• Hall – Many I’ve talked to say it’s a problem of what we’re teaching students
• Chair Nichols – With the Texas Child Mental Health Care Consortium, have a lot of mental health efforts starting; needs to look at parents and home life
• Hall – Somebody needs to start talking about what is causing this, what is the collapse
• Kolkhorst – SB 11 was originally slated to be $50/student on ADA; whatever we do here isn’t scalable, doors cost the same for small schools as large schools
• Kolkhorst – Possible to have a floor, would like you to look at this in cost estimates
• Perry – In FY21 there were 167 terroristic threat conversations with kids statewide, 120 students with threats of a weapon; 300 kids in 2021 that we had a path to put somewhere else but didn’t, $10m to do it properly
• Taylor – Planning and practices haven’t been taken seriously, SB 11 required active shooter training to be done while students weren’t there
• Taylor – Need to look at truancy, took away the teeth, but many JPs were doing a great job; have a lot of telehealth in there
• Taylor – Having someone looking over shoulders of local districts is a good idea, published random audits will encourage action

 

Dr. Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of Texas School Safety Center

• Provides overview of Texas School Safety Center, which is the central policy house for school safety, training, and prevention; Established after Columbine Shooting
• Has provided all Texas schools training, in FY 2021 18,000 school personnel and law enforcement, over 30,000 have completed online courses
• Since 2007, Texas Code requires schools to perform a safety and security audit every year and to report to Center
• SB 11 (86R) implementation – Enhanced role of Center, required threat assessment team, Center is providing trainings for these teams
  • Behavioral threat assessment is a proactive way to prevent a shooting/threat, goal is not to punish but to connect individual with resources they need
  • Trained over 23,000 personnel on threat assessment teams
  • Every school required to submit a safety plan to Center, Center provided feedback
  • Drilling is a key feature to an emergency plan
  • District is required to have a Safety and Security Committee, oversight and recommendations
• Hinojosa – How many schools are actually in compliance with SB 11?
  • 1 district will be having a public hearing for not being compliant, many aspects of the bill, we do not know how many are in full compliance
• Hinojosa – How do we know they are in compliance?
  • District audit report asks school districts very specific questions, platform where information is self-reported by school districts
• Hinojosa – Sen. Perry and I have seen numbers that show the majority of school districts are not in compliance
  • In our first review of the safety plans, only 67 districts had sufficient plans, this is a huge problem
• Hinojosa – How can we better protect our children?
  • SB 11 placed most of the trust in school districts, state needs to follow up and have more accountability, plan is only effective if it is implemented
• Hinojosa – Gov. Abbott sent a letter to your center after the legislation was passed listing all the requirements, I am just trying to identify the problem
  • At a critical point, need to change hearts and minds which is a daily grind, schools need to stay focused on safety and security 6 months from now, need to make it a culture (example: not propping a door open)
• Hinojosa – Has heard the idea of doing public audits so parents can hold students accountable; do you have the proper staff at your Center to enforce and audit?
  • To do a comprehensive audit besides a shooter assessment, no
• Hinojosa – We need to hold school districts accountable for not doing these tasks
• Perry – You did 23,000 trainings for personnel, correct?
  • Yes
• Perry – Is there a process where you follow up to see if they dealt with threat assessments?
  • TEA is charged with collecting that data
• Perry – How many threat assessments were made, did the kids stay in the classroom, did they kid go to DAEP?
  • Commissioner Morath will provide data
• Perry – Are the 37 requirements comprehensive and specific enough to safeguard a school?
  • No
• Perry – Are there doors in classrooms today that lock from the outside and do not have a mechanism to secure from the inside?
  • Many
• Perry – Are there external doors that are not locked automatically or can be overridden?
  • Yes
• Perry – I am told that Uvalde had a review of their EOP and passed with flying colors, is this correct?
  • Yes
• Perry – You have clearly answered that we do not have the specificity to prevent what happened at Uvalde, I encourage you to talk to a wide range of people on campus, students or maintenance people, if you talk to administration, you will only get the same answers
  • Interviewing students and staff would be a part of our follow up check
• Perry – When you do a threat assessment, do you look at financial cost benefit ratio?
  • We should be able to prioritize parts of a school’s plan based on importance and factor in financial factors, we do not do this right now
• Perry – Based on your expertise, what would be more beneficial, hardening our school’s safety infrastructure or a school resource officer?
  • A combination of both, but if I had to pick, hardening our schools
• Creighton – Can you give us an example of the best response you received on the audit?
  • I do not want to name a specific district; Saw active threat plans that saw flip charts of their standard response protocol
• Creighton – What was included in the charts?
  • Looking for plans that covered all 5 phases of the emergency management cycle, threat assessment team in place, team was trained, mitigation policy and procedures, preparedness with drills
  • Multi-hazard plan is exactly that, prepared for multiple hazards
• Creighton – So the total districts that provided a sufficient response was under 70?
  • Correct, 67
• Creighton – What was your response to districts that did not provide sufficient responses?
  • We worked with them to get their plans up to par so they had a basic plan in place
• Creighton – How long ago were those due?
  • There is one district that did not meet the deadline and now going through a public hearing
• Creighton – All the other districts that did turn in a plan but were not sufficient, how are you responding to them?
  • There is a lot of back and forth between us and districts, Center providing constant feedback
• Creighton – Did you provide the template you have posted online?
  • We did, have revised our basic plan template, created a toolkit and online training
• Creighton – I’m assuming some of the plans you received were just a cover letter, did you get responses that were very generic?
  • To an extent, the most extreme was “we don’t have a plan in place,” at this point in time every district has a plan in place
• Creighton – What size was the district you just mentioned?
  • A small school district
• Creighton – Your team would reach out to them and refer them to your template, and ask them to resubmit a plan? Do you enforce this?
  • Yes
• Creighton – Did the 67 districts that had a sufficient plan all have an EOP?
  • Yes
• Creighton – Was the focus on active shooter response, or regional? Wildfire or hurricane based?
  • Initial approach was very high-level over-all plans, focused on communicable disease annex and continuity of operations plan
• Creighton – Are you relying on medical professionals and first responders, or guidelines at the Center?
  • Our staff at the Center make up a diverse background of professions
• Creighton – Do you feel like that stakeholder collection is sufficient?
  • Yes
• Creighton – When are those EOPs deemed insufficient due?
  • Plan to have a call, fall of 2022, will send a notice in early July to all districts
• Creighton – If districts fail a second time, that was already due, what is our response, and do they go to a public hearing?
  • After 6 months of no corrective action or response, it is a public hearing, all the way up to the issuing of a conservator; Problem is lengthy timeline provided to districts
• Creighton – If a second submittal is not passed, is there an example of when you would not move towards a second hearing or conservatorship?
  • No, we would not allow for a third round of submittal
• Campbell – It sounds like the Center is too lenient in time for districts that do not comply
  • We plan to start our second call for plans in the fall, would like to make this an annual process
• Campbell – Sometimes witnesses are hesitant to name names, naming districts following or not following guidelines is center of transparency; Do you have the audit report for Robb Elementary?
  • We have the safety and audit report for Uvalde ISD
• Campbell – Do you have it broken down for only Robb Elementary?
  • No, plans are only collected at district level
• Campbell – How did Uvalde perform? How did you decide it was sufficient?
  • We combine reviewing EOPs with self-reported data,
• Campbell – Did you do physical on-site audits?
  • No, the way the law is written, school districts are supposed to provide us with audits, we do not go out and do the audits
• Campbell – But do you have enough staff to follow up with them?
  • No, also it is not clear on our authority to go do follow up checks
• Campbell – Why?
  • The law does not stipulate that we can do that, we have districts question our authority when we try to follow up
• Campbell – You need to talk to Commissioner Morath, I believe you do have the authority
• Zaffirini – We have been focusing on SB 11 (86R), but we also passed HB 2195 (86R), which required districts to include active shooter policies apart of EOPs, 2020 data showed that only 600/1,000 districts were in compliance, do we have any more current data?
  • We will be requesting that information this fall
• Zaffirini – How can we ensure that bill is implemented timelier?
  • Tighten up timelines for districts to provide information, too long of a gap and that creates back and forth
• Zaffirini – Do you have a report regarding the status of implementation?
  • We do not provide active shooter training, would fall to TCOLE
• Zaffirini – Doesn’t the center look at the policies preventing shootings?
  • We train schools on what to do the first 1-3 minutes a shooter is active, we focus on districts devising what their plans are before first responders arrive, initially districts are first responders
• Zaffirini – HB 690 (86R) requires school board trustees to take a safety training report, do you have status of implementation?
  • Course has been developed, now with SBOE, overseeing training for board members to be implemented in the fall
• Zaffirini – Do you have any ideas for implementing that more effectively?
  • Ensuring from top-down, leadership understands the role they have in ensuring safety, prioritizing and budgeting recommendations put forward to them; Most school board members have no idea what they are supposed to do
• Zaffirini – Do the audit results cover compliance with that legislation?
  • SBOE oversees compliance for HB 690 (86R)
• West – Can you provide us some more on your background?
  • Been with the Center since 2007, background primarily in research capacity, promoted to School Safety Director in 2015
• West – Your agency is also responsible for giving school districts the elements of a good active shooter plan?
  • Yes, we relied heavily on provisions stated in Chapter 37, have identified and developed an active threat template along with training course
• West – To the extent they are not in compliance, you provide them a template?
  • Yes
• West – Did Uvalde have a plan?
  • They did have an active threat plan
• West – Did their actions comply with their plan? Is your Center responsible for evaluating the actions taken?
  • No, and we are not charged with doing follow up compliance checks
• West – Who is?
  • I don’t think anybody is, this is where the legislation stops short, we review the plans but not required to check for implementation
• Perry – This law is based on a Chapter that is not comprehensive or hard enough to protect our kids?
  • Correct
• Perry – The EOP plan is not sufficient to keep our kids from harm, correct?
  • Yes
• Perry – Are the protocols that create a school lock down clearly laid out in your guidelines?
  • Yes, lock the doors, turn lights off, get out of sight
• Perry – What events cause a lockdown?
  • When the threat is inside the school
• Perry – What about a shooter around the community?
  • That would cause a lock out, where all exteriors of the school need to be secured, the best practice is to instruct with the classroom door closed and locked
• Taylor – You could not answer how many schools were failing in compliance, you keep referring to the initial assessment, which was in 2020?
  • Yes
• Taylor – Now we are in 2022, do you have updated numbers?
  • All districts in Texas have a basic plan in place, we continuously review and assess these plans
• Taylor – So all school districts have a basic plan, but you are saying some don’t match up with what they are doing?
  • Correct, best practice does not always match up with plans
• Taylor – It has taken 3 years for the school board training, this is incredibly disappointing, where are we on teacher training?
  • Part of safety and security threat assessment process, in charge of educating staff and students what concerning behaviors are and how to be proactive

 

Mike Matranga, M6 Global

• Former Secret Service agent, specialize in threat assessment and domestic terrorism groups
• Asked to lead Texas City ISD’s security division, created from scratch after Santa Fe shooting, one of the highest ranked in the country
• Specializes in security and SB 11 audits
• There are signs and symptoms of pre-attack behaviors and indicators in shooters
• Believes politics is in the way, EOP means nothing without action, no one following up on the plan to see if it can be put to action; EOPs the way they currently are, are not sufficient
  • Need proper planning and communications
  • Need behavioral identification, does not care about race, but about behaviors
  • Compliance
  • Infrastructure design
• West – In terms of EOPs, are you aware of EOPs in other states?
  • Not in regard to schools
• Kolkhorst – Are there commonalities between people who have committed mass shootings?
  • Yes, severe trauma as a child, early drug usage, lower socioeconomic status in some instances, lower education, mental health
• Kolkhorst – What are your recommendations? The Uvalde shooter exhibited a lot of truancy starting in 5^th grade
  • I would start between 4^th and 5^th grade, a decline in attendance, these instances usually have a triggering event
  • We have a serious problem in our schools, discipline is out of control, teacher’s do not want to stay anymore

 

Jimmy Perdue, President of Texas Police Chiefs Association, Chief of North Richland Hills PD

• Providing comments on prevention, response, and review
• Texas Police Chiefs Association runs an accreditation program for police departments across the country, recommends using this program in some way

 

Stan Standridge, Chief of San Marcos PD

• Police community failed the people of Uvalde
• Stop check-box training, idea that officer will retain information from a training years after the training occurred, trainings must be topical and recurring
• ALERT level one Operator Course, 16 hours long, this must be part of every police officer academy, current training is inadequate for many officers
• Course 2195, apart of SB 11, is specific for school-based law enforcement – Confused why this course exists when ALERT is the gold standard
• 0 hours of school shooter training is required for command officers, this needs to change, ideally 8-16 hours of training should be required
• School marshals are also not taught by ALERT, there must be consistency with training across the state
• A student disciplined for making threats is removed from campus for 3 days, but the Full Behavioral Advisory Team is not triggered
• Police officers do not have access to the CARES system, cannot make a CCQ and determine if someone has had mental health issues
• Recommends grant funding for mental health clinicians to be imbedded in police forces and with 911 operators
• Hinojosa – On the ALERT training system, you were not allowed to teach that to school police officers?
  • Regarding Course 2195, no, and could not be made an equivalent
• Hinojosa – There was an ineffective training in place for our school district police officers?
  • Yes, and for all officers really
• Hinojosa – Marshals do not go through this training?
  • They do not go through ALERT courses, active shooter component taught by ALERT is not included
• Hinojosa – Is the school marshal program effective?
  • I am a strong advocate for the school marshal program, but the 16 hours of ALERT training must be mandated for them
• Bettencourt – I feel like I am seeing turf warfare, why were you denied?
  • TCOLE is responsible for licensing, not sure why TCOLE is in charge of training, TCOLE should answer for that
• Zaffirini – What collaboration is there between police and school personnel to responding to an active shooter?
  • Perdue – Very local answer and depends on the district, has a good relationship with his district but not always the case
• Zaffirini – One sheriff testified they need more ballistic gear, and improvements to radios, would you agree or add anything?
  • Perdue – Every PD should have a P25 compatible radio, interoperability channel exists on all these radios but takes time to set up, especially in the heat of confrontation
  • Perdue – Additionally, new buildings being constructed have windows that block out more UV light, but also block out radio signals
  • Standridge – San Marcos PD does not have much ballistic gear, but what happened in Uvalde was not a deficiency in equipment, it was a deficiency in commitment
• West – How can you help us reassure parents they should have confidence in sending their kids to school?
  • Perdue – Law enforcement is one of the most reviewed agencies, we want to improve ourselves and give the Legislature tangible solutions that can be done; Believes age to purchase a weapon should be 21
• West – To boost parental confidence, you recommend gun measures like raising the age to purchase to 21?
  • Perdue – I believe there are reasonable measures we can put in place that do not infringe on the 2^nd amendment, need to make sure we do not conflate the issues of mass shootings and gun violence in major cities
  • Standridge – Believes we should expand on Texas criminal code for straw purchases, where a friend purchases a weapon for someone else; Federal law in place but only prosecuted at 2% rate, expand power to state
• West – What about red flag laws?
  • Perdue – More of a political issue, we have been supportive of the concept but have yet to see a fleshed-out system, are good things about the concept and would be open to seeing more
  • Standridge – Police can already seize firearms in Texas code if a person is detained for their own welfare
• Creighton – Are you aware of another state with a central database like you recommended?
  • We are not aware
• Creighton – Is the central database a new recommendation, or has that been in existence for a while?
  • There has been an effort to pass a bill relating to this, could be done by TEA, but if a child switches districts, no information follows them
• Perry – Is it fair to say our world gets a little more unsafe every day?
  • Yes
• Perry – We allow criminals to cross the border every day, the second amendment is designed for protection from an overreaching government; If a semiautomatic today is a target, what stops a rifle to be the target years from now, if 21 is the age cut off today, what stops it from being higher years from now? Regarding red flag laws, our judiciary is politicized, we must be aware of both sides in these conversations

 

Brian Hawthorne, Chambers County Sheriff, Sheriff’s Association of Texas

• Officers that initially engaged should have continued engaging and pursued, should have kept him outside, loss of life would have been reduced
• Police officers are trained to respect jurisdiction and command, officers there looked to Chief of Uvalde ISD police department
• Multi-agency responses are always unorganized, and better networking and communication needs to occur between different agencies
• You cannot harden your schools enough, many sheriffs already have SROs, contracting SROs with the local Sheriff’s Dept works because they have the resources already, can minimize costs
• Has personally never witnessed or signed off on an EOP, districts need to review EOPs with the law enforcement agency responding

 

Buddy Mills, Gillespie County Sheriff

• Hardening of schools, training of officers, and coordination of agencies are key
• Hinojosa – Disagrees with one point made by Hawthorne, believes action should have been taken sooner in Uvalde
  • Hawthorne – Agrees, but would not be comfortable with one of his deputies taking control of a scene with a Chief of Police on site
• West – In terms of local threat assessment teams, do the sheriffs and other law enforcement officials normally sit on those committees and have input?
  • Hawthorne – Yes, many do, Sheriff’s Association would fully endorse having a better network between schools, PDs, and Sheriffs Depts
• West – If sheriffs are sitting on that committee, I would want them to see the plan itself, correct?
  • Mills – Sits on school district’s committee, provides a lot of input
• West – Does everyone sign off on it before it gets sent to the Safety Center?
  • Mills – That has not been the case
• Kolkhorst – Do we need to put this in statute, to determine an incident commander?
  • Hawthorne – Can be very complicated, commander could be on vacation or not available
  • Hawthorne – Regarding Uvalde, the Chief should have realized he could not handle and relieved his duties, it was a leadership problem
• Bettencourt – Maybe we should create a template for an SRO? A memorandum of understanding
  • Mills – Would be more than happy to help

 

Solomon Cook, Chief of PD for Humble ISD, Texas School Districts Police Chief’s Association

• Provides overview of responsibilities in Humble, including the communication system that has been established
• All agencies are in constant communication and there is no confusion of jurisdiction

 

Bill Avera, Chief of PD for Jacksonville ISD, Texas School Districts Police Chief’s Association

• Bill last session improving databases faced opposition over concern of profiling of students
• Prefers police officers, but understands marshals are necessary due to lack of officers; agrees with expanding ALERT training to marshals
• Retired peace officers face difficulties getting their licenses renewed, should look into this issue with TCOLE
• Need additional help with social media and discipline in schools
• Buildings need to be secured, every police officer in his force has a key to access every door
• Mental health and behavioral assessment teams should be strengthened
• Texas has not adequately funded mental health services since 1976
• Have hands tied with truancy, not able to enforce or discipline
• Campbell – There are a lot of highly trained veterans, what do you think about putting them on campuses?
  • Avera – Would not have a problem if they could pass a phycological exam
  • Solomon – Appropriate in some areas, my area is fortunate to have a large police force, many agencies, and plentiful equipment
• Campbell – But that is still after the fact, some schools have fathers walking around to protect the kids
  • Avera – I would be okay with that, I think it just needs to be authorized in statute
• Nichols – Do you require your police department to go over EOPs with districts?
  • Avera and Solomon – Yes, must be good coordination

 

Keith Bryant, Superintendent of Lubbock-Cooper ISD, Texas Association of School Administrators

• Number one goal is student safety
• Lubbock ISD voted to put an officer on every school campus, not a lot of districts have done this
• Goals: Presence is a deterrent, build relationships with students, safety and security anytime there is an event on campus
• SROs should be able to take a shooter down within 30 seconds
• Number one priority should be engaging with kids and walking them through their issues
• SB 11 and SB 19 are both good bills, no problem with the school safety allotment being separate
• District would see a benefit if the school safety allotment was increased

 

Jay Killgo, Superintendent of Vidor ISD

• Supplement the lack of officers with security guards
• Older campuses cannot be made single entry, have tried to improve safety with fencing and other measures
• Have moved elections off campuses due to safety
• Campbell – Did you both receive audit requests from the Texas School Safety Center?
  • Yes, both did
• Campbell – Do you feel like that has a value? Or is it just paperwork?
  • Bryant – Yes, I do think it is a value, another measure of accountability
  • Killgo – There is value in another set of eyes
• Perry – The 30 second response time, is that tested or on paper?
  • Bryant – That has been tested in our buildings, believes it is a realistic goal in his district
• Perry – Not sure why the magnetic strip route is picked on school locks, should be reevaluated; In your tenure as superintendent, have you come across kids that don’t belong in a classroom?
  • Bryant – There are kids that do not fit in a public-school setting, and need to be moved to another facility where they are not a danger
• Perry – Would you believe kids in this position are better if they ‘move on in life’? Are we being short sighted in requiring a child must be 18 before they leave school?
  • Bryant – Yes, some kids would be better served not in school
• West – In your respective school districts, what is the consensus about raising the age to purchase an assault weapon?
  • Bryant – Have not heard a lot of dialogue about this
  • Killgo – Agrees with Bryant, conversations more about school safety
• West – If the Legislature only reformed school training, would your parents feel comfortable about sending their children back to school?
  • Killgo – It would go a long way, likes the idea of local discretion and letting districts decide how to best spend money
  • Bryant – Parents pay attention to local issues
• West – Has your organization taken a position on raising the age to purchase an assault weapon?
  • Bryant – We have not taken one, not sure if discussion is going on
• West – Are local police agencies involved in your EOPs and safety committees? Do they have final sign off?
  • Bryant – Yes, they are in my district and have final sign off, not sure if this is a uniform practice
  • Killgo – Local law enforcement is a requirement on that committee, along with many other entities
• Zaffirini – What if school boards do not adopt an EOP? How do we hold them accountable?
  • Bryant – That is why we have the accountability system with the Safety Center, parents should hold districts accountable if not
• Zaffirini – What recommendations would you like to see this Committee adopt to make parents feel safe sending their children to school?
  • Killgo – Publishing audits to see what each school district lacks or has, greater transparency for parents
  • Bryant – There still must be confidentiality with districts for safety, building plans for example do not need to be published
• Zaffirini – How do your local law enforcement agencies collaborate with the district?
  • Bryant – Constant communication, we coordinate with Lubbock PD, Lubbock ISD PD, DPS, Sheriff’s office
  • Killgo – Drills are conducted with other entities in local region, safety committee is really a valuable tool for districts, formalizes the process
• Zaffirini – What safety equipment do your safety personnel have?
  • Bryant – Do not have shields, but have a plethora of other equipment
  • Killgo – Firearms, looking into obtaining shields and devices to break down doors
• Zaffirini – Do you have an opinion on teachers being armed?
  • Bryant – Does not believe so, has a police force in district
  • Killgo – Does not believe so
• West – In terms of making sure parents are comfortable, would you support a grading system for school district safety plans?
  • Bryant – Would take a lot of convincing to support that, wants to be able to correct problems, potential shooters can take advantage of weaknesses
  • Killgo – Worry about the complexity in developing a system, districts have diverse sets of needs and requirements
• Bettencourt – The entire school accountability system is based on a grading system, we are trying to get information to the public, and a low score would be a strong motivator to districts
• Kolkhorst – What do you mean by parent involvement?
  • Bryant – There are parents really involved with their kids lives, and there are parents who are not involved at all, the greater the parent involvement the more successful the child is, important that schools do everything they can to involve the parent
• Kolkhorst – What would you want to see with tools regarding truant kids?
  • Bryant – Ability to pursue criminal charges in some of these cases
  • Killgo – Agrees, seen a decline in attendance after COVID, need legislation to back them up
• Kolkhorst – What do you use on mental health tools?
  • Bryant – We have two LPCs, we use Cater, Star Care, multiple agencies are involved
  • Killgo – Received several grants for telehealth for mental health services, weather issues and COVID have had huge impacts on mental health
• Kolkhorst – Do you use TCHAT?
  • Killgo – We do

 

Dale Avant, Texas Department of Public Safety

• Provides overview on fusion centers, which is a collaborative effort between agencies to maximize agency effectiveness on a criminal response
• 80 fusion centers nationally, with 8 located in Texas
• After Santa Fe, TxDPS expanded effort in fusion centers to monitor for domestic terrorism and mass casualty events
• Fusion centers played a critical role in preventing a school shooting last year in Ingleside, TX
  • Individual posted threatening online post, police confronted him at his home, killed himself, had already killed family, was going to attack a school that afternoon

 

Lexi Quinney, Texas Department of Public Safety

• Provides overview of suspicious activity reporting program, iWatch Texas
• Use of single statewide reporting system ensures all information is integrated
• Designed to create a comprehensive response to mass casualty and tragic events
• Suspicious activity reporting is done through a behavioral focused approach
• iWatch Texas has reports separated based by school, with new schools being added daily, TEA has provided a list with schools not on the network, owners of site control the data, do not reveal sensitive information while still being on the network
• In 2021, there were 1700 matches on platform which created over 800 threat patterns
• Has not been integrated in all schools, DPS did not have a single report for Uvalde ISD prior to the shooting
• Hinojosa – Would a fusion center helped in Uvalde?
  • Avant – We would not have been able to help without help from the community, the Ingleside incident had a private individual notify Texas law enforcement, which was then reported to the fusion center
• Perry – You take referrals from anyone, correct?
  • Avant – Correct
• Perry – Do you get referrals from social media companies?
  • Avant – Rarely when it is an eminent threat
• Perry – Would you take a referral from a district on a student based off a feeling? Due to their behavior
  • Avant – We don’t actively monitor, if the behavior met the threshold, we could continue to monitor
• Perry – Have we marketed iWatch to the public?
  • Quinney – We have, has been sent across the state, more work needs to be done
• Kolkhorst – Is iWatch where someone should report concerning behavior?
  • Avant – We look at all reports to iWatch, will not let anything go untouched for 24 hours, request and recommend they report everything to iWatch
• Nichols – What opportunities do you recommend maximizing the effectiveness of what you are doing?
  • Avant – Everything you guys have talked about today, getting the word out more
• Nichols – Do you guys advertise?
  • Avant – We have done some slight advertising, there is a bigger push from the Governor’s office
• Nichols – The reporting you get, is that mainly coming from students, parents, or faculty?
  • Quinney – We don’t get a lot of students or faculty even, more general community members, reporting from social media companies would be beneficial
• West – Are there similar systems in other states?
  • Avant – No other state to my knowledge handles suspicious activity reporting like Texas

 

Servando Esparza, TechNet

• Provides overview of TechNet, representing over 90 technology companies
• Many member companies incorporate AI and humans to monitor social media content, with millions of posts being taken down
• Platforms encourage users to immediately reach out to local law enforcement if they believe one is in immediate danger or are a threat to others
• Platforms provide information to law enforcement in cases of emergency, danger of deaths or serious injury
• Perry – How long does it take you to turn in a request?
  • If it meets the imminent harm standard, platform immediately turns information over, if law enforcement requests, between 2-30 hours
• Perry – Who determines if it is an emergency or not?
  • Federal law determines when an emergency is, involving death or serious injury
• Perry – So if someone says they are going to shoot their family, is that an emergency?
  • Unless there was information saying it was imminent, it would be questionable, no certain time given
• Perry – It requires an initiative from the law enforcement community to social media, what would require TechNet group to send to law enforcement first?
  • If someone posted something saying they were going to attack someone tomorrow, or as soon as they find them
• Zaffirini – If it goes into effect, what impact would HB 20 have on monitoring?
  • TechNet opposed HB 20, exclusions in the bill for social media companies allowed questionable content to remain up and for individuals to sue for damages
• Zaffirini – What can we do to ensure law enforcement officials work more effectively with social media companies?
  • Sharing intel, seeing content that users will try to cross post across platforms, platforms have also provided training to law enforcement in order to best request information off their site
• Zaffirini – Do you believe law enforcement training should address requesting information from platforms?
  • Yes, many law enforcement agencies do not submit legal order with request or request is too broad
• Zaffirini – Brings up Washington Post article discussing Uvalde shooter threatening multiple people online but being dismissed as a threat, how can we increase people’s sensitivity of what really poses a threat?
  • If a lot of the information had come from different sources, or having cross intel, would have helped make threat more credible
• Hughes – How many companies make up your organization? Any we would recognize?
  • 97, Google, Meta, Pinterest, Next Door, YouTube, Instagram, Twitch
• Hughes and Esparza enter a back-and-forth discussion on the contents of HB 20 and the actions of TechNet in lobbying against the legislation and the Supreme Court case striking the law down
• Hughes – If transparency reports were published as pursuant to HB 20, could that have helped prevent the Uvalde shooting?
  • A lot of that information pertaining to the removed content is self-published by companies
• Hughes – But not all?
  • No, not all
• Hughes – Do you agree that law enforcement officers and policymakers could respond to events better with this information?
  • Yes
• Hughes – Will you push your members to publish transparency reports like those in HB 20?
  • Yes, many members already do, and we did not oppose this section of the legislation

 

Brent Dupre, Office of the Attorney General

• Provides overview of law enforcement officers at AG’s office interact with social media companies
• Southern Texas Internet Crimes Against Children Taskforce – rely on social media platforms to help catch criminals
• Social media companies are already federally required to provide information, would like to see the split between what is required federally and what is voluntary
• In his experience, he says that social media companies usually determine emergency status, not law enforcement

 

Public Testimony

Stephanie Luper, Bullard ISD Trustee

• We still have the same issues facing Texas public schools since 2019
• Advocating for more school safety funding, Bullard ISD currently does not have sufficient funding
• Need to focus on mental health crisis
• Commit to providing full state funding for recommendations the Committee will provide
• Kolkhorst – $9.72 was supposed to be more, but was reduced during negotiations, thanks Luper for attending the hearing
• Hughes – Thanks Luper for her work in his district and community
• Luper – Not certain how long it takes TEA and SBOE to create trainings for school board trustees, but TASB has created multiple trainings for trustees, those are not required and are opt-in

 

Steven Aleman, Disability Rights Texas

• Recommendations: 1) For people with mental illness not be stigmatized by the policy response and 2) school phycologists are prioritized in schools

 

Bradley Hodges, Self

• Claims the school system has been taken over by “woke” activists, violence has taken over schools, and school discipline is gone